Five questions with Anthony Cordesman
Iran last week seized 15 British sailors and marines, sparking new concerns about oil flows out of the Persian Gulf. Some 40 percent of the world's oil exports moves through the narrow Strait of Hormuz at the gulf's southern end. Anthony Cordesman, a national security analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, spoke with Chronicle reporter David Ivanovich.
Q: Does Iran have the capability to stop oil shipments through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz?
A: Iran can certainly create a risk to any tanker or ship moving through the strait for a limited period of time. It would take the U.S. several days to organize an attack to destroy Iran's capability to threaten the strait and some 10 days to two weeks to secure the rest of the gulf.
All tanker traffic and shipping normally moves past islands that Iran has occupied near the shipping channel — the two Tunbs, Abu Musa — and Iranian islands like Jazireh. The naval branch of the Revolutionary Guards can use small craft to raid shipping. Iran can also use anti-ship missiles based on land or on ships and aircraft. It can deploy three Kilo submarines with long-range homing torpedoes and midget submarines. It has mine warfare capability. These are tactics that can harass shipping, increase risk premiums and potentially scare away shipping until the U.S. destroys Iranian forces.
Iran, however, does not have an effective air force, and most of its surface-to-air missiles and radars are obsolete. It has no real surface navy. It would very quickly find itself under attack from the United States and probably could not survive for more than a week or so. At the end of that time, tanker traffic and shipping would flow again, and Iran would have lost most of its war-fighting capability, at least of its naval and air forces.
Q: Could Tehran disrupt oil loadings or shipments by its neighboring gulf states?
A: Iran can always conduct raids. It can present a threat and try to intimidate. If it is afraid of a major clash or war, it can use tactics like conducting sporadic raids at low enough levels to hope it doesn't trigger a major U.S. military response. There are other more anonymous tactics like free-floating mines in the gulf. The difficulty is if it rises above the harassment level, the world simply is not going to stand by and wait. It's not going to tolerate this.
Q: Wouldn't Iran suffer as much as anybody from a supply disruption?
A: Iran's economy is dependent on oil exports. It's very dependent on imports of food and refined products like gasoline. There are major targets in Iran, which the U.S. could strike to make Iran even more dependent, like strikes on its refineries. To put it mildly, any Iranian military action in the gulf would be a two-edged sword and probably be very self-destructive.
Q: If tanker trade through the gulf were disrupted, what alternatives would nations in the region have to export crude?
A: When you look at the realities of the alternatives that exist today, only Oman has the ability to export through the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman.
The Saudis have a series of pipelines which go to ports on the Red Sea, but these are already being used. You're talking about suddenly having to redirect 17 million barrels a day away from the gulf. The truth of the matter is, you don't have an alternative to the gulf.
Q: What would be the U.S. military's best response to any effort to disrupt oil shipments?
A: One thing we have to understand is the U.S. response should be tailored to what Iran does and proportionate to it. Sending one rubber boat to fire a rocket at a tanker — which is what happened in the Iran-Iraq War — is not something that should trigger a major confrontation. Gulf tanker companies learned during the "tanker war" of 1987-1988 that you can ignore a lot of low-level activity by the naval branch of the Revolutionary Guards.
But, I think the answer has to be in practice that the moment Iran does anything serious to threaten traffic through the gulf, the United States Navy and U.S. Air Force would have to act quickly and decisively.
I strongly suspect that U.S. planning is based on the doctrine that if Iran did succeed in striking at any targets in the Gulf of Oman, the Strait of Hormuz, the rest of the gulf or in a southern gulf state, it would immediately suffer far more damage in return than it could ever inflict.
