BP executives rejected a $150,000 budget request in 2002 that would have piped flammable hydrocarbons to a flare instead of the blowdown drum, which could have prevented the 2005 explosion that killed 15 people and injured many others, according to documents and testimony Friday morning in the trial of a lawsuit filed by four workers.
The explosion occurred after a piece of equipment overfilled with flammable liquid hydrocarbons, and vented vapor ignited during startup of a unit that boosts octane in gasoline. Investigations into the blast have said a flare, a more modern and safer alternative to the blowdown drum, could have burned off the fluid which could have prevented or limited the explosion.
In an e-mail presented as evidence, a BP engineer recommended against the expense because flares were not mandated by the government and he estimated there was only an 80 percent chance the law would require flares within the next five years. Emails presented at the trial showed other officials supported the decision not to spend the money.
Don Parus, the former head of BP's Texas City refinery, stopped short of testifying that installing a flare would have prevented the explosion.
"The outcome would have been different," said Parus, who also testified the Texas City refinery was making profits of more than $1 billion a year.
The trial involves four contractors who are suing BP for injuries and emotional distress inflicted by the blast. BP says their claims are weak and they are using the blast to seek big payoffs.
Struggling with safety
In his second day on the witness stand, Parus talked about long-standing struggles to make safety a higher priority and to get the oil giant to spend money on safety equipment and training.
During the afternoon session, Coon presented documents to bolster his argument that BP officials had what one document described as a "checkbook mentality," ignoring repeated warnings about shortfalls at the refinery for the sake of saving money.
He introduced a 2001 safety assessment of BP's South Houston area operations, which included Texas City.
These operations have "the potential for events which could result in multiple deaths, property damage, business interruptions and damage to the BP brand reputation."
An August 2002 memo between an executive in London and another BP official said it would be good if Texas City could return to its 1995 form when it was considered "the Amoco jewel."
He blamed the deteriorating condition first on a lack of spending by Amoco, before that company was acquired by BP, and then on BP's 1999 order to cut budgets across the company by 25 percent.
An October 2002 BP document presented as evidence said Texas City had the second highest number of hydrocarbon leaks of all BP refineries and was overdue on more than 1,000 inspections. The document said $297 million was needed to fix the infrastructure.
Struggles with worker morale
There were also problems with worker morale because of BP decisions to cut retiree health benefits for new hires, and feelings that management was not concerned about safety.
With Parus on the stand, Brent Coon, the attorney representing the workers, produced several examples where BP had cut spending for various safety training and equipment, including fire-proof blankets and steel-toed boots.
Even after a damning workplace survey at the refinery that found many workers feared they might die on the job, cuts continued, further damaging Parus' efforts to improve relations between management and workers, he said.
"People still felt nothing had changed," Parus said.
Parus, who is among four senior executives targeted to be fired in an internal BP investigation completed in February, has been on paid leave from the company since May 2005. He testified Thursday that he still draws a $279,000 annual salary.
His testimony is expected to take the remainder of Friday.
